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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine an organizational form that has received little attention despite its social significance – 
the refugee camp. From an in-depth case study of the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya we explain how 
these organizations maintain social stability even though refugees live for decades in them and are 
deprived of the freedom to move or work outside the camp’s boundaries. Our analysis finds that 
refugee camps are characterized by a parallel organizational structure in which the institutional worlds 
of (primarily Western) camp officials and (in our case, primarily Somali) refugees coexist. Mutual 
dependence between camp officials and refugees enables the use of a respected space of reciprocal 
tolerance and minimal intrusion, and a listening post that is perceived as a legitimate communication 
arrangement and that acts as a safety valve. These complementary mechanisms provide the means by 
which to allay the otherwise high potential of severe discontent.  
 
Keywords: organizations, integrating mechanisms, total institutions, refugee camps 
 
Editor’s Comment: In addition to describing a largely neglected form of organization - a refugee camp, 
the discovery in this paper is that where refugees and camp officials are mutually dependent but also 
highly differentiated in their purposes and approach, distance rather than proximity between the 
different worlds is required and is accomplished by a combination of respected space and listening 
posts. 
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ORGANIZING REFUGEE CAMPS: ‘RESPECTED SPACE’ AND ‘LISTENING POSTS’ 
 “Refugee camps are per definition temporary solutions. And that is how they are planned.”  
(Refugee camp official, 2014) 
 
Organizations come in all shapes and sizes. In recognition of this diversity early organizational 
research studied a wide array of organizations, such as political parties, schools, and military 
organizations, to understand their distinctive features and implications (Heydebrand, 1973; March, 
1965). An implicit assumption was that difference matters and that explaining the heterogeneity of 
organizational forms should be a central purpose of organization theory. More recently, we seem to 
have lost sight of this heterogeneity. Nearly two thirds of organization theory research focuses upon 
one type of organization - the corporation (Walsh, Weber & Margolis, 2003). Furthermore, as 
Greenwood, Hinings, and Whetten note, too often the literature treats “all organizations as though 
they are the same, or at least as though any differences are irrelevant for purposes of theory” (2014: 
1207). The tendency is to generalize insights garnered from one to all organizations.  
There are exceptions to this pattern, notably the study of not-for-profit, public administration 
(e.g. Salamon & Anheier, 1992), and healthcare organizations (e.g. Meyer & Goes, 1988)1. Such fields 
of research show how different types of organizations are characterized by distinctive organizational 
dynamics. We build on this approach by studying the refugee camp - an organizational vehicle with 
the overarching goal of protecting and providing for refugees, and an emerging secondary goal of 
preventing refugees from being recruited by terrorists. Despite becoming increasingly prevalent and 
important in modern societies, refugee camps have so far received almost no attention from 
                                                 
1 The exceptionality of not-for-profits and public administrations, health organizations, and management consultancies is 
also reflected in the Academy of Management, where they are the only types of organizations with dedicated divisions (i.e., 
the public and non-profit division, the health management division, and the management consulting division). 
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organization theorists. An exception is Mintzberg’s (2001) two-day observation of the activities of two 
International Red Cross camp managers in a Tanzanian refugee camp.  
Today over 65 million persons are forcibly displaced from their homes, more than ever before 
(UNHCR, 2016a). A frequent response is to host them in refugee camps until the cause of their 
displacement is resolved. Media portrayals of refugee camps emphasize the short-term and 
humanitarian nature of these camps – usually depicting starving and injured refugees, desperately 
waiting for help in food distribution queues and makeshift hospitals. In fact, the average length of stay 
is nearly 20 years and for some refugees this represents their whole life to date (Milner & Loescher, 
2011). The average refugee camp, therefore, exhibits little of the humanitarian despair depicted in the 
media – instead, the prevailing emotions are extreme boredom and frustration because once refugees 
enter a camp they relinquish their autonomy and are not allowed to work or move freely outside the 
camp, unless to return home.  
Hundreds of refugee camps already exist worldwide and their numbers are growing 
exponentially. For example, roughly 40 refugee camps are currently operational in Greece, compared 
to only four a year ago (UNHCR, 2016c). But we know little about how they are organized so as to 
overcome the permanent threat of violence that could arise from the refugees’ boredom and 
frustration, and the risk of the camps becoming breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment. Given the 
growth in the number of refugee camps and their societal importance, the moment is appropriate for 
understanding how this type of organization is governed and managed.  
To do so, we revisit an organizational form introduced by Goffman (1961): the ‘total 
institution’. For Goffman, a total institution is an organization that is relatively removed from society 
and that encompasses all aspects of its members’ daily life. Despite sharing these characteristics, not 
all total institutions are the same. Goffman identifies five “groupings” (1961: 16) – exemplified by 
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prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, work camps, and monasteries – that differ in various ways, 
in particular by the mechanisms through which social stability is maintained – which is usually the 
central challenge for these organizations and a prerequisite for accomplishing organizational goals. 
These mechanisms range from coercion (as, for example, in prisons and mental hospitals and, to some 
degree, nursing homes), to remuneration (as in work camps), and shared ideology (as in monasteries). 
In emphasizing the central importance of social stability, Goffman is implicitly highlighting a 
significant difference between these organizations and those more typically studied (such as public 
and private bureaucracies) for whom ‘coordination’ is the more typical challenge. 
We propose that refugee camps protect and provide for refugees in a delimited and usually 
remote place within which all aspects of life take place - and thus meet Goffman’s definition of a ‘total 
institution’. Yet they are distinctive in several important ways – specifically in how they use novel 
mechanisms of social stability - and thus constitute a unique type of organization.  
At first glance, refugee camps are most similar to prisons and mental hospitals in which social 
stability is maintained through coercion (Berk, 1966; Cressey, 1959; Thomas, 1984). In the refugee 
camp, in contrast, even though the circumstances would suggest that contestation and violence would 
be prevalent, camp employees rarely use coercion against refugees, and refugees – despite incidents of 
violence to resolve conflict among themselves – very rarely exhibit violent behavior towards camp 
employees. Stability of the camp organization is thus not achieved primarily through coercion. 
Moreover, in Goffman’s total institutions, the ‘inmates’ undergo a process of “mortification” (23), 
during which they cede their prior identities and adopt a new ‘inmate’ role, thus contributing to the 
organization’s overall stability (Mouzelis, 1971). In the refugee camp, in contrast, we find that 
mortification processes are largely absent. Refugees instead retain their imported identities. 
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Given the lengthy tenure of refugees in the camps, the restrictions on their rights to move 
freely outside the camp, and that their lives are characterized by boredom, idleness, and lack of 
autonomy, it is puzzling that the inmates of refugee camp organizations refrain from violent protest, 
as has been found to happen in prisons under similar circumstances (e.g., Useem & Goldstone, 2002). 
The absence of violent rioting is even more surprising given that among refugees, “it is impossible to 
quantify the amount of violence” (Crisp, 2000: 54). Yet despite refugees’ propensity to violent 
behavior toward each other, violent contestation directed at the camp organization does not seem to 
occur. 
To explain the absence of violent protesting we conducted an in-depth qualitative case study 
of Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Our main contribution is to theorize this new organizational form 
and identify two distinctive mechanisms of social stability, each rooted in the mutual dependence of 
employees and inmates. These mechanisms are ‘respected space’ and ‘listening posts’. The second 
contribution is to elaborate upon these mechanisms that facilitate effective organizing through 
distancing rather than bridging in organizations that are characterized by high differentiation and 
mutual dependence, and to suggest other organizational settings where these mechanisms might be 
apposite. Third, and more broadly, our paper responds to calls to study difference rather than similarity 
across organizations (Greenwood et al., 2014; Whetten, 2009) by turning attention to a neglected type 
of organization – the refugee camp – that is of growing contemporary importance. 
 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Although organizations come “in a bewildering variety of shapes and sizes” (Scott, 2003: 11) 
the existence of distinctive types of organizations is often little more than an afterthought (Whetten, 
2009; Walsh, Weber, & Margolis, 2003). Studies of one organization – usually a corporation – are too 
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easily, though often implicitly, generalized to all organizations (Whetten, 2006). Yet as early as 1967 
Thompson warned that “the discovery of universal elements is necessary, but alone … provides a 
static understanding” (Thompson, 1967: xxv) and called for research into the diversity of 
organizational forms so that we might better understand how organizations function.  
One organizational form that received early attention but more recently has been neglected is 
the ‘total institution’ (Goffman, 1961; also see Clegg, 2006). Goffman was interested in organizations2 
such as prisons, mental hospitals, boarding schools and monasteries, each of which he termed a total 
institution, namely “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, 
cut off from the wider society…lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (1961: 11). A 
total institution, in other words, is characterized by three distinctive features: its collective purpose is 
to harbor people in an enclosed space removed from society; it dissolves for ‘inmates’ the separation 
of work from personal life; and its organizational structure is comprised of a “large managed group 
(…) and a small supervisory staff” (Goffman, 1961: 18) with limited opportunity to transition from 
one group to the other, i.e., there is no career path between the two groups. 
Within this organizational form Goffman differentiates five types: organizations that care for 
harmless individuals (orphanages, nursing homes); organizations that care for harmful individuals 
(mental hospitals); organizations that protect society from harmful individuals (prisons, POW camps); 
organizations that pursue work-like tasks (army barracks, boarding schools); and religious 
organizations (monasteries). Goffman placed the five types on a continuum, acknowledging that they 
are not mutually exclusive: “At one extreme we find the quite involuntary entrance of those who are 
sentenced to prison…at the other extreme, we find religious organizations” (Goffman, 1961: 110). 
                                                 
2 For Goffman, whose work preceded Meyer and Rowan (1977), the term institutions is synonymous with types of 
organization. As Greenwood and colleagues noted, scholars initially “referred to institutions as types of organizations, 
such as prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages” (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008: 4). 
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Three mechanisms of social stability – coercion, remuneration, and normative control – can be 
superimposed on the continuum (these three mechanisms were taken from Etzioni, 1961; see also 
Davies, 1989, and Mouzelis, 1971). Total institutions characterized by “involuntary entrance” 
(Goffman, 1961: 110) tend to be associated with coercion and ‘mortification’ processes in which the 
inmates cede prior identities and roles to the total institution (Mouzelis, 1971). Entry as a “volunteer” 
(Goffman, 1961: 110) is linked to remuneration (work camps) and normative beliefs (monasteries). 
Refugee camps fit the definition of total institutions. First, they are physically and 
geographically removed from society, to an even greater extent than is the case in Goffman’s typology. 
They are usually located in remote and thinly populated areas (Turner, 2015), outsiders are prevented 
from entrance, and refugees are prohibited from leaving unless to permanently return to their home 
country (Ramadan, 2013; Turner, 2005). Second, all aspects of social life for both refugees – ‘inmates’ 
– and camp officials largely take place inside the refugee camp (Mintzberg, 2001). Refugee camps are 
thus more enclosed than other total institutions since even staff do not depart from the premises 
outside working hours. Finally, the ratio of inmates to camp officials is very high. The average camp 
is composed of 11,400 refugees with usually only a few hundred staff members (in the Dadaab camp 
there are approximately 400 staff members for 250 000 refugees), making refugee camps relatively 
large total institutions managed by comparatively few individuals (UNHCR, 2013).  
However, a crucial distinguishing characteristic of refugee camps is that the mechanisms of 
social stability identified by Goffman (1961) are relatively lacking. Prisons and mental hospitals are 
marked by coercion exercised by guards (Grusky, 1962; Thomas, 1984; Trammell, 2012; Useem & 
Goldstone, 2002), and by doctors and nurses (Denzin, 1968; Scheff, 1961) who can punish and 
physically restrain inmates and patients if they break the institutional rules (Berk, 1966; Bonner, Lowe, 
Rawcliffe & Wellman, 2002; Slade, 2015). Coercive mechanisms are used because the inmates are 
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regarded as risks to society and perhaps themselves. Refugee camps in contrast are characterized by 
the absence of coercion between camp employees and refugees - even though refugees may exhibit 
violent behavior toward each other (Crisp, 2000). Refugee camps also lack any apparent overarching 
religious beliefs, as found in monasteries. Finally, unlike work camps, refugees are not remunerated 
(with the exception of a very small number of stipended volunteer positions). Yet as Mintzberg points 
out, “keeping a steady state…(is)…almost obsessional” in refugee camps (2001: 770). In short, 
although refugee camps fit the broad definition of a total institution they are unlike any of the five 
types that Goffman distinguishes. 
Furthermore, the situation of refugees would lead us to expect that serious unrest - even 
perhaps to the point of implosion - would be characteristic. Although there are reports of how 
refugees regulate quarrels among themselves with violence – similar to how they would have done at 
home (Crisp, 2000; Rawlence, 2016) – there are virtually no reported instances of serious rioting 
against the refugee camp organization or camp officials (Lewis, 2011). On the contrary, long-
established refugee camps, such as Dadaab, are reported to be generally harmonious (Turner, 2005; 
2015; Werker, 2007). In Dadaab, the only exceptions are momentary protests when camp officials 
intrude upon the refugees’ living quarters (Lewis, 2011). Refugees themselves refer to the camps as a 
“peace zone” (Al Jazeera, 2016: video). Hence, the absence of the mechanisms of social stability that 
characterize other total institutions raises the puzzling question of how social stability is maintained.  
The absence of contestation and conflict between refugees and camp officials was also 
personally experienced by the first author when an employee of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), where she was exposed to the dynamics of the Za’atari refugee 
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camp in Jordan3. Especially noticeable was that although Syrian refugees had already been in the camp 
for months – with no indication that they would be able to return home any time soon – they showed 
few visible signs of discontent regarding their prolonged stay toward camp employees. This is not to 
say that refugees experienced no violence in the camp. Within the refugee community, incidents such 
as theft or perceived breaches of cultural and religious rules were met with coercive sanctions imposed 
on the perpetrator by the refugee community. Given refugees’ use of coercion in their day-to-day 
camp life, it is even more surprising that relations between refugees and camp officials were non-
violent, i.e., that violent behavior seemed contained within the refugee community. 
This prompted the first author to begin recording data about the Za’atari camp, as preparation 
for a more systematic study that would follow. She began to note her observations at the end of each 
workday in a field diary and, through informal conversations with colleagues, probed for explanations 
as to why social relations in the camp were relatively stable bar isolated incidences of violent behavior 
among refugees. These initial observations and conversations brought no satisfying answers. The 
connection to Goffman’s concept of the total institution was evident – but so, too, was the relative 
absence of his three mechanisms of social stability. The question of how social stability is maintained 
in refugee camps remained an intriguing puzzle and became the motivation for the research detailed 
below. 
METHODS 
Research Design 
For a systematic study following initial exposure in the Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan we 
adopted a qualitative case study approach because it allows for exploration of contexts of which little 
                                                 
3 The first author departed UNHCR in 2013 and has since not been affiliated with the organization in any way. The other 
co-authors have had no affiliation with UNHCR. The first author had no affiliation with the Dadaab refugee camp prior 
to the field visit for this research project. 
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is known (Yin, 2003). The study proceeded in two stages. First, we sought confirmation that the 
situation in Za’atari was typical. To do so we analyzed media reports (98), UNHCR field reports (41), 
government communiqués (9), UNHCR reports (27) and NGO reports (46), research publications 
(13) and books (2). We also interviewed 7 camp officials who were managing camps in Nepal, Jordan, 
Yemen, Afghanistan and Eastern Europe to investigate whether the dynamics observed in Za’atari 
resembled those observed in other refugee camps. Second, following this confirmatory phase we set 
out to explain the surprising social stability of refugee camps through a more detailed case study. The 
Dadaab refugee camp was chosen because it had existed for over 25 years without notable incidents 
of protest or organized violence against the camp organization (Rawlence, 2016; Turner, 2015). 
Moreover, given the camp’s unusually large size the absence of riots of the 250,000 refugees was even 
more puzzling. Further, we were informed by the seven camp officials that the Dadaab camp is 
‘representative’ of refugee camps elsewhere. As such, we saw it as providing the opportunity to 
“unlock the ordinary” (de Rond, 2012: 260), which often becomes transparently observable in extreme 
cases (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The Dadaab Refugee Camp 
The Dadaab refugee camp is located in one of the most deprived and sparsely populated 
regions of Kenya (Rawlence, 2016). Originally designed in 1992 to handle 90,000 refugees, the camp 
has grown to accommodate nearly 250,000 Somalis, distributed across five sub-camps: Dagahaley, 
Hagadera, Ifo, Ifo 2, Kambioos.4 Roughly a third of its refugees were born and raised in the camp and 
have never left it (UNHCR, 2015a). The Dadaab camp is run by camp officials who provide immediate 
                                                 
4 Although the refugee camp organization is therefore relatively large, it is similar in size to many corporations, 
such as McDonald’s (420 000 employees) or Amazon.com (340 000 employees), and far smaller than others 
(e.g. Walmart with 2.3 million employees). 
  
12 
emergency assistance to new arrivals every day whilst simultaneously maintaining food distribution, 
medical services, and education programs for all other refugees in the camp. The physical distribution 
of aid items is contracted to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that deploy aid workers that 
specialize in humanitarian aid, such as medical care, nutrition, education, shelter, or sanitation. We 
refer to UNHCR camp managers and aid workers more generally as ‘camp officials’ and ‘camp 
employees’.  
Refugees form by far the largest proportion of camp inhabitants. Many arrive traumatized, 
starving and injured after having walked through the desert for several days (Rawlence, 2016). Upon 
arrival refugees are registered and provided with an immediate assistance kit and a 21-day food ration, 
and the roughly 30 per cent of arrivals that suffer from acute malnutrition are hospitalized (UNHCR, 
2015b). After being allocated a tent, refugees collect their monthly food and aid package on prescribed 
dates and from the distribution warehouse specified on their ration card. Three hospitals, 25 schools, 
and three adult literacy centers provide additional services. As refugees recuperate, their life is marked 
by almost permanent boredom and long waits (Horst, 2008; Turner, 2005). As one Dadaab refugee 
put it: 
“…the problem that people have now, it is a psychological problem. Because they live in the 
closed camp for years. They can’t have that freedom of moving out of the camp, getting jobs. 
So what can they do? For example, the youths were educated in the camp. They have a diploma 
but they cannot work. They can only sit at home and help their mothers in the household. 
That is no life.” (Interview, refugee 1) 
 
Although refugee status grants temporary protection and humanitarian assistance, it prohibits freedom 
of movement in the host country, employment, and owning or running a business5 (Horst, 2008; 
Wesangula, 2016). 
                                                 
5 Although the Refugee Act of 2006 theoretically grants refugees’ the right to apply for a work permit, they can only do so 
by appearing in person in Nairobi, which is roughly 300 miles from Dadaab. Since refugees are not allowed to leave the 
  
13 
Like all refugee camps, the Dadaab camp is fully dependent on the financial donations of 
European and North American governments – whose interest is, in addition to a humanitarian 
obligation, the prevention of large-scale migration of refugees to Europe and North America – and 
upon the benevolence of the Kenyan host government. The camp has an annual budget of $120 
million (UNHCR, 2015b). Donors only offer temporary support, usually in twelve-month intervals. 
As one camp employee explained: “Dadaab has existed for nearly 25 years now and we still plan as if 
it is an emergency. The donors don’t fund multi-year. We budget on an annual basis because we receive 
money on an annual basis” (Interview, camp official 14). 
The expectation that the Dadaab camp is a temporary organization is emphasized by the 
Kenyan government, which is increasingly concerned that the camp is becoming a permanent 
settlement and in response has repeatedly threatened to close it (McCormick, 2016; The Economist, 
2016). In part, the government’s stance is motivated by an “increased anti-Somali sentiment in Kenya’s 
political discourse” (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 18) and the perception that refugees have outstayed 
their welcome. Moreover, recent terrorist attacks in Nairobi and near the Dadaab camp by the Somali 
terrorist group Al-Shabab have fueled concern that “the camps have become hosting grounds for Al-
Shabab as well as … enablers of illicit weapons proliferation” (Government communiqué 3). The 
perceived possibility of terrorist activity in the camp – which carries the risk of jeopardizing funding 
from governments in Europe and North America who might no longer perceive the camp as a 
successful holding pen for refugees – has put pressure on camp employees to appease donors and the 
Kenyan government. Appeasement is achieved by presenting the Dadaab refugee camp – in reports 
and during visits of outside officials – as an organization that offers a socially stable environment for 
                                                 
camp, they are unable to submit an application and are therefore effectively barred from working or operating a business 
(Library of Congress, 2016). 
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the displaced to wait until they can return home again, thus ensuring that the refugees do not become 
a risk to Kenyan society or migrate to Europe or North America. 
 
Data Sources 
Following previous research in extreme and unconventional contexts (e.g. Cruz, Delgado, 
Leca & Gond, 2015; de Rond, 2017), data was collected from three sources – observation, semi-
structured qualitative interviews, and archival documents. 
We conducted an in-depth study of the camp between November and December of 2015. We 
observed the day-to-day work of managing the camp, such as budgeting, report writing, planning the 
logistics of aid distribution, the hosting of representatives of donor governments, and the organizing 
of resettlement cases. Moreover, during escorted visits to the refugees’ part of the camp, we saw their 
housing structures, the camp’s illegal markets, and more generally witnessed lives in the Dadaab camp, 
such as children playing soccer, long lines at the water distribution points, or women carrying home 
their groceries from the market. Although we attended some of the management meetings held by 
camp employees in the staff compound, we were not allowed to attend the formal council meetings 
between camp employees and refugees. Instead, we interviewed participants immediately after the 
meetings and consulted subsequent reports and minutes. All observations were recorded in a field 
diary (41 pages). 
We held semi-structured qualitative interviews with 14 refugees6, 25 camp officials, and 13 
expert consultants – e.g., evaluation experts, temporary project associates, and ‘thought leaders’ 
currently or formerly involved in the Dadaab camp. Before arrival in Kenya, the first author was 
                                                 
6 In this paper, we use the terms refugees and inmates interchangeably. Although refugees’ stay in the camp is voluntary, 
they are forcibly displaced from their homes and, over time, their stay in the refugee camp becomes involuntary, thus 
increasingly resembling the situation of inmates. 
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advised that “there might be one or two opportunities per month I’d say where if you’re lucky you 
could talk to some of the refugee leaders” (Interview, camp official 4). To avoid the risk of interviewing 
only a handful of refugees who were pre-selected by UNHCR and might thus provide overly positive 
narratives of their life in the camp, we independently contacted refugees through social media prior 
to the first author’s visit to the camp. In messages, we clearly communicated our intent and that the 
refugees’ accounts would be anonymized. From these initial contacts, we gained further referrals to 
other refugees living in Dadaab camp. Once in Dadaab, the face-to-face interviews with refugees 
required the presence of camp officials. We therefore decided to also conduct phone interviews – 
without the presence of camp officials - which would allow us to have more open conversations since 
refugees could share insights into their lives, including activity considered illegal by camp rules, without 
risking negative consequences. In total, we held 24 interviews with refugees.  
Nonetheless, sensitive topics such as incidents of rape and the role of mafia gangs remained 
difficult to discuss as we sensed a clear reluctance to delve into these topics in detail. In our interviews, 
therefore, observations of how refugees’ expressions, tone of voice, and general body language 
changed became important to understanding the meanings underlying spoken words (Putnam et al., 
2016). In the follow-up phone interviews, silences, pauses and hesitations took on a similarly central 
role and again occurred primarily when we inquired about incidents of gender-based violence and 
gang structures. Although our transcripts thus lack elaborate explanations pertaining to gender-based 
violence and gang structures, we were able to capture the meaning of what was said by analyzing 
changes to body language and tone. 
Interviews with camp officials and expert consultants were partially conducted prior to arrival 
on site. Camp employees and consultants were referred to us through personal contacts at UNHCR 
who had also facilitated our access to the Dadaab refugee camp as a research site, which is highly 
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restricted to outsiders. During fieldwork, interviews with camp officials and expert consultants were 
conducted on an ad hoc basis following personal encounters. Interviewees reacted particularly 
positively to the first author’s former affiliation with UNHCR and voiced relief that – as a former 
insider – she would understand and appropriately represent the difficulties and short-comings of camp 
management and life.  
All interviews, which lasted from 40 to 120 minutes, followed a semi-structured interview 
schedule - conducted in English (which all refugees speak fluently) - that prompted interviewees to 
recount their experiences in the camp. In addition, we asked refugees to video record episodes of their 
daily life. The 7 videos document how refugees experience the Dadaab refugee camp. 
Finally, we collected extensive documentation, initially about refugee camps in general and 
later about the Dadaab refugee camp more specifically. Having had the advantage of studying 
documents from other refugee camps (71 media reports, 15 UNHCR field reports, 20 UNHCR 
reports, 32 NGO reports, and 13 research publications), we knew which documents were available 
for the Dadaab refugee camp and thus added 27 media reports, 26 UNHCR field reports, 9 
government communiqués, 7 UNHCR reports, 14 NGO reports and 2 books specifically pertaining 
to the Dadaab refugee camp to our data. The UNHCR reports detail the statistics and strategies 
associated with the management of the Dadaab refugee camp. To ensure that our view was not biased 
in favor of a UNHCR perspective, we also collected information from reports written about the camp 
independently, e.g. by the Kenyan government (government communiqués), journalists (media 
reports) and researchers (books). 
 
Data Analysis 
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We followed a grounded theory approach to our data analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), 
systematically arranging small units of data in order to gradually abstract patterns and theoretical 
dimensions (Langley, 1999). The analysis proceeded in three steps. We began by identifying data 
relating to refugees’ and camp employees’ life and work in the Dadaab camp. With the help of the 
data analysis software NVivo, we isolated a total of 137 data passages – our first-order codes – with 
information on the routines, habits, norms, values, and perspectives of refugees and camp employees. 
We used these first-order codes to develop diagrams of the relationship between refugees and camp 
employees. Over the course of several discussions between ourselves, we clarified insights, explored 
alternatives, and ultimately created a shared account that provided us with a clearer understanding of 
the complexity at play. At this point, the co-existence of the two distinctive institutional worlds of the 
refugees and of the camp officials respectively became apparent, as did the distinctive dynamics in 
each institutional world. Whereas small local incidents of violence regulated refugees’ institutional 
world, the camp officials’ world was characterized by formal rules regulating the minutia of daily 
interaction. The interaction between these two highly distinctive institutional worlds seemed an 
important basis for explaining social stability in the camp. 
In the second phase of coding, we abstracted from the first-order codes and surfaced a set of 
second-order codes, i.e., further interpreting our initial interpretations of the data (Van Maanen, 2002), 
to capture the implicit meanings and understandings associated with the two worlds. For example, 
data passages referring to informal soccer tournaments, community-funded mosques, and refugee-led 
businesses were clustered into a more abstract second-order code termed Somali social structures. At this 
point, we not only abstracted information about the refugees’ and camp employees’ institutional 
worlds but also developed a more nuanced understanding about how the two worlds relate and 
interact. It became apparent that the relationship between refugees and camp employees is 
  
18 
characterized by what we later termed mutual dependency, and that interactions take place in a spirit of 
non-intrusion and tolerance.  
Third, we “zoomed out” (Nicolini, 2009: 1392) from the micro-level practices, beliefs and 
expectations and reflected on our overarching motivating question, which was to explain the absence 
of protest and turmoil. We engaged in a lengthy and iterative process of moving between the raw data, 
key data elements, and more abstract categories. This iterative process involved several “uncodifiable 
creative leaps” (Langley, 1999: 691), from which we developed a theoretical model of how social 
stability inside the refugee camp is maintained. This theoretical abstraction from the data enabled us 
to identify two distinctive mechanisms – respected spaces and listening posts – that are key to maintaining 
social stability in the Dadaab camp. 
--------------------- 
Because the subjectivity of qualitative methodologies can influence how we perceive and 
interpret data (Van Maanen, 2010), we engaged in constant “critical reflection” (Alvesson & 
Skoedberg, 2000: 6) about the data and the initial codes. The data was collected and coded by the first 
author, and the second and third authors challenged her perceptions and interpretations in order to 
minimize the risk of “staying native”, i.e., the inability to create analytical distance from the research 
context (Alvesson, 2003: 187; see also, Evered & Louis, 1981). 
Moreover, since logistical and safety concerns determined the scope of data collection, our 
database – as with all databases – is biased. For example, the first author could only move in the camp 
during daylight, meaning that her personal impressions of the refugees’ institutional world after dark 
are limited, which enhanced the importance of capturing the refugees’ accounts of their institutional 
world. Aware of such potential biases in our data, we validated our narrative account with various 
informants, such as camp officials, refugees, and expert consultants. Moreover, we presented our 
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analysis to a group of experienced humanitarian, policy, and military officials in the context of a 
NATO-sponsored workshop on Leading Sustained Co-operation in Fragile Environments. Participants 
agreed with our explanations and identified similar dynamics in their respective work contexts in 
Jordan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Finally, the manuscript was shared and validated by one refugee and 
one camp official. Exchange with practitioners throughout the data analysis as well as validation of 
our analysis with camp officials (also from other camps) and refugees was particularly important to 
ensure that our analysis captured the essence of camp life despite biases in the data. Regular feedback 
loops ensured that our analysis resonated with those who had a more holistic understanding of daily 
life in refugee camps. 
 Table 1 summarizes our theoretical framework and empirical themes, and illustrates the 
triangulation of data and data sources from which our theoretical argument was distilled.  
--------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 1 about here  
--------------------------------- 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE DADAAB REFUGEE CAMP 
The three primary goals of the refugee camp are to provide residence and basic living 
requirements to displaced persons, to maintain social stability within the camp, and to prevent refugees 
from being recruited by terrorists. To achieve these goals the refugee camp is organized into two 
distinct institutional worlds7: the Western world of the camp officials, which is arranged as a formal 
bureaucracy; and the world of the refugees, which draws upon traditional Somali social structures of 
close family ties, sharia law, and mafia like gangs. In the terms of organization theory, there is high 
‘differentiation’ (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) between these two parts of the organization.  
                                                 
7 This separation of the organization into two parts was not planned from the outset – it evolved.  
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Below we develop two points. First, the social stability within a refugee camp fundamentally 
depends upon the two worlds recognizing their mutual dependence. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that 
camp employees are as much in a situation of dependency as are the refugees. Each of the two worlds 
tolerates and minimally intrudes on the other because of this mutual dependence. Nevertheless, and 
this is our second point, key to the stability of the organization are two mechanisms that separate and 
connect the two component worlds. These mechanisms – respected space and listening posts – together 
contain and hold in check the serious risk of discontent and any isolated incidents of rioting or terrorist 
recruiting.   
 
Two Institutional Worlds, One Organization 
The most striking feature when entering the Dadaab refugee camp is its distinctive two worlds. 
On the one hand, camp employees are immersed in highly structured processes for the timely and 
reliable delivery of humanitarian assistance, i.e., their world is that of the Western bureaucracy. On the 
other hand, the refugees use familiar components of Somali culture in order to curb boredom, reduce 
idleness, and improve their daily experience.  
Western Bureaucracy. Camp employees arrange the purchasing, transportation, and 
distribution of aid through a set of formalized procedures. In this respect, this part of the organization 
resembles the structure of many Western bureaucracies. It has defined procedures specifying how 
food, shelter, sanitation, or medical care is to be distributed, by whom and when. For the most part, 
the day-to-day work performed by camp employees focuses on the delivery and recording of these 
services. A second role concerns relationships with donors and the Kenyan ‘host’ government. These 
relationships are conducted through written reports and at regular meetings. The many reporting 
requirements maintain accountability. The result is that: “The normal programming in Dadaab is very 
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structured. UNHCR is a strong coordinator of who does what and they evaluate who is strong in what 
and allocate tasks accordingly-” (Interview, camp official 16) 
Adherence to these rules and procedures is instrumentally motivated. Most employees 
consider their position in the Dadaab refugee camp to be one step in a long-term humanitarian career. 
Employment positions and hierarchies are clear, payment structures are transparent, and regular 
performance evaluations provide clarity of prospects for promotion. Dadaab is considered a 
challenging duty station and employment in it can advance a career. As a relatively junior camp 
employee (#7) explained to us: “They usually don’t have enough staff to cover the positions that they 
budgeted for. That’s why you’ll find that a P2 is actually doing the job of a P3. It can be hectic but if 
you do it for half a year or a year and you do a good job they might promote you to P3”. 
Somali Social Structures. The rules and procedures in the refugee part of the camp are very 
different. Because of unremitting boredom and idleness, refugees have gradually imported Somali 
economic, social, and political structures, which today form the basis for a distinctive second 
institutional world. Four such structures are very evident. The first is an extensive number of small 
entrepreneurial businesses – such as bars, restaurants, fruit and vegetable stands, repair and 
maintenance shops, barbers, and phone stores – even though these are ‘completely illegal.’ Formally, 
all commercial activity is forbidden. Nevertheless, many refugees have repurposed their tents into 
small businesses, and built an illegal economy within the camp organization that amounts to roughly 
$40 million of annual turnover, largely financed through remittances from outside relatives and illicit 
trade with the host community (Okoth, 2012). As a refugee (#4) explains: “Of course there are 
businesses. There are all sorts of businesses blooming here.” One implication is that more structure 
has been placed in the daily round of activities:  
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“Look, you can set your alarm for every Saturday at 11:00AM. That’s when the mangos and 
avocados come in. It’s like clockwork and everyone goes and buys their fruit and vegetable 
(…) There are two dozen camels slaughtered in Hagadera [one of Dadaab’s camps] every 
single day. Meat and vegetables, stuff we don’t distribute, there’s still a demand for that. A 
huge demand.” (Interview, camp official 5) 
 
------------------------------------- 
Insert photo 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
 
A second imported social structure is respect for family ties. Traditionally, Somalis are 
embedded in “a strong social network that entails the obligation to assist each other in surviving” 
(Interview, expert consultant 4). This sense of family obligation is often heightened in the refugee 
camps because families have suffered the forced exodus from their homeland, and entered the camp 
together. Not surprisingly, the family unit remains important to the refugees as they seek to adjust to 
life in the camp. Hence, although the camp employees initially arranged tents into neat blocks 
separated by a grid of wide ‘roads’ that would facilitate oversight and monitoring, the refugees moved 
their tents so as to cluster families together: 
“The refugees would come and UNHCR would tell them to set up their tent in a certain spot. 
And that was Road 1. And once they filled up Road 1 they moved on to Road 2 and so on. 
But people didn’t really like that. You know, you’d have Ahmed come to the camp early on 
and so he set up his tent on Road 1. And then, when his cousin arrives three weeks later, – 
and by that point they filled up the road – we tell him to set up his tent in Road 6, that’s not 
what he’s going to do. He’ll go to Road 1, where Ahmed is, and Ahmed will move his tent 
over a little bit so that his cousin can set up his tent next to him.” (Interview, camp official 3) 
 
Aerial shots (see photos 2 and 3) of Dadaab show how the camp’s initial grid infrastructure 
has largely dissolved as tents are pitched closer together than originally intended and spill into the 
roads that then effectively become unusable for UNHCR vehicles. Complementing the close family 
ties are councils of male elders. These informal councils follow the Islamic sharia law, the dominant 
Somali legal system, which provides a set of clear rules to guide Muslim communities and outlines 
violent punishments for rule-breakers. Adultery, for example, is to be punished by lashing or stoning 
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(Afsaruddin, 2017). Moreover, in the absence of a prison system, most punishments mandated by the 
informal councils involve coercion. In addition, the councils administer wedding ceremonies, settle 
disputes among refugees, and provide guidance - for example by obliging refugees to donate to the 
most vulnerable members of their community: 
“During the recent ciid (celebration at the end of Ramadan), when it is common to contribute 
to people with problems, we [informal religious council] came together to discuss what to do. 
We identified five of the most vulnerable families and bought them clothes for the children. 
That is our obligation as Muslims.” (Interview with refugee, research report 2) 
 
------------------------------------- 
Insert photos 2 and 3 here 
------------------------------------- 
The third imported social structure is religion. Nearly all Somalis are Muslim and draw upon 
their religious values in daily life. In addition to traditional clothing, such as veiling and modest dress 
for women, refugee communities have organized the construction of mosques, each headed by an 
Imam, also a refugee, who ensures the on-going provision of religious instruction: 
“Mosques are financed by the refugee communities themselves. The mosque has a committee 
that provides the services for cleaning, calling for prayers by the Imam, preaching, and all kinds 
of repairs and renovations. So, each block has its own mosque and is financed by the block 
family member. They place one Imam to run the services of the mosque and assign religious 
committee leaders that prepare holiday festivals, like Eid. On that day, refugee communities 
gather together and share their problems, and everyone who can donates to build a mosque 
or do repairs.” (Interview, refugee 14) 
 
Five times a day, the Imam calls for prayer, thus structuring the refugees’ daily life. 
The fourth social structure is more coercive. Refugees also import into the Dadaab camp the 
culture of violence that has become normalized in Somalia following two decades of civil war. As 
publications on Somalia explain, “banditry and looting still form an important part of the lifestyle for 
many young men” (Bakonyi & Stuvoy, 2011: 367) and “in Mogadishu [capital of Somalia] today one 
encounters women and even young children bearing arms” (Adam, 1992: 20). In the camp, similar to 
Somalia, informal refugee leaders, many of them former community leaders or members of the 
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military, have assumed power through a combination of coercion and charisma. The many informal 
leaders that coexist in the camp negotiate clear spheres of influence, usually through clan affiliation. 
Occasional clashes between them or attempts by other refugees to usurp their role or territory, 
provoke violent resolution. A long-term expert consultant explains: 
“The people organized themselves as they had done back home. Clans collected together in 
certain blocks. People who had been elders and elected officials back home slipped easily into 
positions of authority in the emerging forums of the new camp. Some appointed themselves 
‘block leaders’ and would go to the authorities with complaints from their constituents.” 
(Rawlence, 2016: 141) 
 
The informal refugee leaders usually gather a small group, ‘gang members’, and enhance their 
influence by taking measures to ensure general safety, e.g., through the organization of regular camp 
patrols, by protecting the refugee-led businesses that pay a small fee, and by maintaining peace among 
refugees through ad hoc dispute resolution. The informal refugee leaders not only defend their sphere 
of influence against other informal leaders but also resolve safety concerns through the threat of 
violence. 
“If anyone steals from my shop, they know the consequences. They will have a beating, if they 
only steal small thing. Like an avocado. But if they steal big thing, if they steal my money, it 
will be worse. … It will be done by the police. By the refugee police we have here in Dadaab.” 
(Interview, refugee 9) 
 
These moments of violence, however, are discreet, and localized within the refugee’s part of 
the camp – they do not involve the camp employees. When we explicitly inquired about gang-related 
violence, one refugee exclaimed: “the Westerners are always shocked about the gangs and want to 
know everything. For us, they are not the important part of life”, emphasizing that informal leadership 
structures constitute but one component of refugees’ institutional world. 
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Moreover, the informal leaders are well-regarded in the camps as they – in addition to 
providing safety for the refugees – often maintain ties to Somalia and are able to negotiate solutions 
for refugees’ family members left behind in Somalia. For example: 
“Two women sit in plastic chairs and pour out their troubles. One says her…husband is stuck 
at the border; the police won’t let him pass. Can [informal leader] get him in? [Informal leader] 
snaps open one of his cell phones and barks out orders. “Ok, it’s been solved,” he says to the 
women. They are grateful and relieved. How he solved it, he wouldn’t say.” (Interview in 
research report 3) 
 
It is thus important to note that within the refugees’ institutional world, traditional Somali 
understandings of coercion as a means of punishment and by which to negotiate power are imported 
into the camp. The day-to-day life of refugees may thus encompass incidents of violence, as did their 
life in Somalia (Horst, 2008). A former long-term camp official summarizes: 
“Much of the violence experienced by refugees in Kenya is inflicted upon them by members 
of their own family and community. According to aid agency staff, domestic violence 
(normally involving the physical abuse of women, children and adolescents by adult men) is a 
regular occurrence within the camp.” (Crisp, 2000: 55) 
 
 Importing their own institutional values helps refugees regain a sense of meaning and purpose 
during their long stay in the camp. Many informants spoke to us of ‘having a reason to get up in the 
morning’ because of their business. One informant recounted how his business activity enabled him 
to exercise choice, such as “what will I eat for lunch? I can go and I can buy it. I do not have to eat 
only maize every day [the main content of food aid packages]” (Interview, refugee 2). Similarly, 
mosques uphold meaningful rituals such as weddings, baptisms, and burials, and informal refugee 
leaders and councils settle inevitable disputes between refugee families. Nevertheless, there is still 
extreme boredom and, most importantly, there is no explicit schedule for refugees to return to their 
homeland – there is only a seemingly and often vague hope.  
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Despite these circumstances, there have been only rare instances of serious unrest toward 
camp employees, who are in large part ‘responsible’ for the refugees’ hopeless situation. Moreover, 
the efforts of the Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabab, to recruit from the bored and hopeless refugees 
in Dadaab, have been largely unsuccessful. Yet, the situation is only relatively secure. It is widely 
appreciated by camp officials and refugees that the risks of unrest and violence and of terrorist 
recruitment are very real. They well remember that in 2011 two camp employees were kidnapped by 
Al-Shabab and held hostage for nearly two years (Rice, 2011).  
The Dadaab camp is thus characterized by an awareness of the consequences that would ensue 
if the social stability between camp employees and refugees broke down. An NGO report is very clear 
on this risk: “it is critical to prevent this volatile stew from erupting into deadly violence” (NGO 
report, 1). On a more personal note, one consultant put it this way: “We’re all aware of what could 
happen. Most of us have colleagues who were injured or worse in the field. (…) You can’t think about 
it. Most of us just get on with it…But we all know, if we don’t work with the refugees, we can pack 
our bags (…) or wait for Al-Shabab to come after us” (Interview, expert consultant 5). 
So, how is this ‘volatile stew’ prevented from ‘erupting’? The Dadaab case suggests two 
complementary mechanisms – ‘respected spaces’, and ‘listening posts’ – underpinned by a shared 
recognition by refugees and camp officials of their mutual dependence.  
 
Mutual Dependence  
The risk of the simmering discontent escalating into violence, and of the potential for camps 
to become recruitment grounds for terrorists, is recognized by both refugees and officials, and, given 
the incidents of violence that characterize refugees’ institutional world, the risk constitutes a realistic 
concern. How the worlds interact, therefore, is key to understanding why violence is contained. A 
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core starting point is that both refugees and camp officials are aware that the threat of terrorist 
recruitment is curbed or at least held in check by the Somali social structures to an extent beyond that 
which might be accomplished by the camp officials. Similarly, both sides recognize that the refugees 
are reliant on the camp officials for sustaining the legal protection afforded by the camp. There is, in 
other words, an awareness of their mutual dependence. 
 The Dependence of Camp Officials. Camp officials have become increasingly concerned 
that terrorist groups may take hold in the camp. As one interviewee emphasized: “We know there are 
branches of Al-Shabab operating out of Dadaab” (Interview, camp official 3). Moreover, it is well 
known that Al-Shabab primarily targets young male refugees who have been in the camp for most of 
their life. Camp officials, however, have few means by which to monitor and prevent these clandestine 
attempts at recruitment. The direct personal interaction between the camp employees and the 250,000 
refugees primarily occurs during the latter’s arrival and registration in the camp, and during aid 
distribution; thereafter there is little interaction – except through their elected representatives (see 
below). For their part, camp employees are preoccupied with managing, sourcing, and distributing aid, 
as well as planning and budgeting for the upcoming months. They spend nearly all their time inside 
their offices, answering emails, making phone calls, and completing budget spreadsheets. They have 
neither the time nor the resources to directly monitor or police the Al-Shabab infiltration. As one 
camp official (#3) explained: “we have little we can do to contain terrorists so we cross our fingers 
and hope that refugees have their own safety infrastructure that keeps Al-Shabab out. So far I would 
say it is working”.  
The camp’s illicit businesses are instrumental in preventing the disillusionment of young 
refugees who may otherwise join radical groups: 
  
28 
“The majority of the youth is educated. They are just held back by their refugee status. They 
are not going back home because of the security situation. They are all working in the market 
[of the refugee camp]. Even though they are paid very little, that little that they get can help 
their family.” (Interview, refugee 11)  
 
In addition to providing employment, the refugees’ leadership structures more actively prevent 
Al-Shabab from taking root in the camp. Refugees, who asked not to be quoted directly on this 
sensitive topic, described to us how ‘guards’ regularly patrol the markets and serve as the ‘eyes and 
ears’ of the refugee community, and to whom business owners report suspicious purchases or 
activities. These unofficial, self-organized policing structures constitute a vital mechanism for 
preventing terrorist activity in the Dadaab refugee camp. As one refugee guard explained: “We know 
that there are quite a few people who try to do bad things. We call them, we do screening, we also 
give them a role to be part of the community. To have something to do.” (Interview, refugee 13). 
The importance of these unofficial policing activities is recognized by the UNHCR: 
“community policing groups created and led by the refugees themselves have been critical to curtailing 
violence and gathering information on the perpetrators” (Document 6). Hence, rather than prohibiting 
these ‘illegal’ activities, camp employees tolerate and appreciate them.  
The Dependence of the Refugees. Refugees in turn, depend on the protection afforded by 
camp employees. Returning to Somalia does not constitute a viable alternative – therefore, the survival 
of the refugees depends on the ability of camp employees to secure international support from 
European and North American government agencies and for ensuring the tolerance of the Kenyan 
government. In Kenya, public opinion towards refugees has grown negative and Kenyan authorities 
have become more ruthless towards any refugee found outside the camp. A refugee details how, in 
the exceptional circumstances in which they are permitted to leave the camp (e.g., to travel to an 
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outside hospital if care cannot be provided by the camp’s hospital) they are singled out by police and 
forced to pay bribes in exchange for passage: 
“I used the travel document approved by UNHCR. But there are several checkpoints from 
Dadaab to Nairobi. At every checkpoint, police will come and say: provide your ID. If you 
don’t have, they will say: come to the office. They will check your document. They tell you  it’s 
okay but this morning I have not taken tea. Do you have something? You give 500 shilling 
(approx. $5). Every checkpoint you pay. But without the document you would not even be 
able to pass the first checkpoint.” (Interview, refugee 9) 
 
Many refugees lack any documentation, such as passports or birth certificates: “Most refugees 
have the mandate letter from UNHCR as their only form of identification. The letter stipulates that 
they are refugees and outlines their rights. But many don’t have any other form of ID” (Interview, 
camp official 4). Hence, they are especially vulnerable to threats to close the camp. Moreover, the 
Kenyan government’s increasingly less tolerant position is regularly reported in newspapers and radio 
shows, which are widely accessed in the camp, constantly reminding refugees of their precarious 
situation. They are very aware that the camp might be closed if there were open instances of violence 
within the camp and/or if the camp was perceived as a recruiting ground for Al-Shabab.  
 
Mechanism 1: Respected Spaces 
The awareness of mutual dependence underpins a central feature of the refugee camp – the 
quiet recognition and acceptance by camp employees and refugees that the other exercises cultural 
and jurisdictional authority over its part of the organization. In effect, there is a respected space that 
separates the two institutional worlds. Each side tacitly understands that only camp employees are in 
a position to accomplish the critical goals of retaining external support and of obtaining humanitarian 
aid, and that only the refugees can contain the risk of violence and terrorism. Each also understands 
that the other’s contribution requires tolerance of the cultural norms that will be deployed. For 
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example, even though camp employees are aware that some of the camp’s formal rules are being 
flaunted (as in the existence of markets, the practice of gender discrimination, the relocation of tents, 
and even the use of coercion by gangs) they turn a blind eye. As one refugee commented: “I don’t see 
the interference of UNHCR here in the camp. For example, I never see them in the market” 
(Interview, refugee 7). In return, refugees tolerate the Western cultural rules that determine how aid is 
distributed within the camp, how representatives on the councils are selected, and pay lip service to 
Western attempts at gender equality (see below). They are also respectful of camp employees.  
There is, in other words, tacit acceptance of the social norms and practices that will be applied 
over which sets of activities, and by whom they will be applied. In effect, this mechanism separates 
the two worlds. In organization theory terms, there is a division of responsibility and of authority – 
but one that is highly unusual in that the bases of the authority applied in the two parts of the 
organization are very different. This respected space separates the two worlds and in doing so enables 
them to collaborate.  An implication of this mechanism of respected space is that there are none of 
the ‘mortification’ processes that Goffman (1961) observed as characteristic of prisons. 
 
Mechanism 2: Listening Posts 
The second mechanism, in contrast, brings the two worlds together through listening posts that 
serve two purposes: as an information exchange, and, as a safety valve. For refugees, listening posts 
are a means of communicating concerns to camp officials, and for camp officials they are a means by 
which to disseminate information to the refugee community at large. But, and significantly, the 
listening posts allow both sides to learn of frustrations and violent simmerings as they begin to build 
up in the refugees’ institutional world.  
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Listening Posts as Information Exchanges. In any organization, a division of responsibility 
requires compensating arrangements that coordinate the separated parts. In the refugee camp this is 
accomplished by ‘councils’ that were initially established to bring together refugees and camp 
employees in a quasi-representative democracy (an implicit goal was to provide Somalis with 
experience of democracy and, by insisting on equal electoral representation of males and females, to 
advance Western norms of gender equality). Today, the Dadaab refugee camp has nearly 100 refugee 
representatives, each elected for two-year terms, on three levels of representation. The process is 
hierarchical: “Each block is headed by a male and a female block leader…[who] elect a male and a 
female section leader…All the section leaders will in turn elect the overall chairman and the chairlady 
of the camp” (NGO report 5). Although these elections prescribe male and female representation, 
official reports admit that ‘because of strong cultural traditions, most decisions are made by men 
without consulting women’ (NGO report 6).  
The formal and primary purpose of the elected councils is to discuss the day-to-day concerns 
of refugees. For refugees, however, the council meetings are also a rare and important opportunity to 
raise issues and to release frustrations about their situation – even though the councils have no formal 
decision-making power. Minutes of council meetings reveal a variety of issues brought to the attention 
of camp employees, such as flooding during the rainy season, disease outbreaks, sanitation and 
hygiene, unsatisfactory aid packages, and concerns over the possibility of camp closure. Moreover, the 
elected refugees take this opportunity to raise grievances in blunt and often emotional terms. The 
minutes are interspersed with mentions that “refugee leaders passionately described” (field report 11), 
“bemoaned that” (field report 12) and “voiced anger about” (field report 13). 
Although the councils lack formal decision-making authority, the issues raised by refugees 
usually lead to practical responses: “For example last year, there was a flooding in some areas in 
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Hagadera [a sub-camp of the Dadaab camp]. We told the UNHCR in the [council] meeting how bad 
it was. They did not know because they had not seen the flooding. But then they came with a truck 
that brought bags with sand to help us. You see, the meetings are very important” (Interview, refugee 
1). This type of response helps legitimate the councils to the wider refugee population – and, it has 
the additional advantage of giving credibility to information disseminated through the council by the 
camp officials.  
 For camp officials, the meetings are thus key to keeping informed about refugees’ needs and 
of their frustrations. They have become a vehicle by which camp officials learn of possible currents of 
unrest and by alleviating smaller concerns as they become aware of them – as in the example of the 
flooding referred to above – they are able to ‘manage’ the simmerings of discontent that might 
otherwise escalate. Similarly, camp officials use the council meetings to communicate changes in camp 
management - e.g. alterations in food distribution schedules and opening hours of the hospitals, or 
information on voluntary return to Somalia – that could lead to frustration if introduced without 
explanation. But, and importantly, the council meetings also help camp officials gather reliable 
information about any latent threats of terrorism in the camp. A camp employee recalls how, when 
she attended a council meeting “they [refugee representatives] were giving us all sorts of detail on what 
Al-Shabab was doing in the camp. (…) They tell us because they are as worried about it as we are” 
(Interview, camp official 11). In other words, the role of information exchange translates into the 
listening post as a ‘safety valve’.  
Listening Posts as a Safety Valve. Although the three levels of elected representation are, 
in one sense, a hierarchy of representation, that imagery is misleading. The councils are part of a 
broader mosaic of ties through which information moves and suffuses from, and through, the Somali 
world. Noticeably, the elected representatives do not include the informal refugee leaders, who avoid 
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the visibility associated with elected positions, but it is informally assumed that representatives on the 
council and the informal refugee leaders work closely together (as in the example of the ‘guards’ given 
above). More openly, council representatives meet with the local Imams and family elders, providing 
a rich texture of relationships and conduits of learning. A refugee, whose father is an Imam in the 
camp, told us that his family maintains social ties with the elected representative: “Yesterday evening 
we were in a restaurant together. He is my close friend” (Interview, refugee 6). 
The councils, in other words, represent a bridge between the Western and Somali worlds. As 
such, they are: 
 “very essential … since they link the refugee community with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agencies. They are also involved in the conflict 
resolution and management at block level. They closely work with UNHCR in ensuring that 
refugee concerns are addressed.” (NGO report 5) 
 
Their legitimacy and relational scope enable the councils to be an effective safety valve. That 
role was strikingly shown in the first half of 2011 when roughly 1,300 refugees were arriving in the 
camp every day, which led to overcrowding and lengthy waits of several months until new arrivals 
could be allocated a tent. To make do, refugees began to build informal housing structures while 
waiting. However, since some of the constructions were blocking access to a food distribution center, 
camp employees and the Kenyan police attempted to tear them down unannounced. A camp official 
reflects on the situation at the time:  
“We were under tremendous pressure. The Kenyan government was on our backs, the 
refugees were on our backs. I don’t remember why we decided to just tear down those houses. 
That’s not normally how we do things. (…) We were stressed, people were overworked. We 
were under pressure. We had to come up with some solution quickly.” (Interview, camp 
official 1) 
The destruction of refugees’ houses violated the implicit agreement of non-intrusion between 
camp employees and refugees. It was, to use our term, a significant breach of the respected space and 
triggered spontaneous riots: 
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“Yesterday saw serious disturbances in the Dagahaley section of the Dadaab refugee complex 
in Kenya. Rioting broke out when police sought to disperse a crowd that was protesting an 
attempt to demolish illegal structures around a food distribution point. Teargas was used, and 
later live gunshot. Our information is that two refugees were killed and around a dozen 
injured.” (Media report 3) 
 
Demolition of the dwellings was stopped immediately following the outburst of violent 
protest. In July and August of 2011, the riot was discussed repeatedly at council meetings and the 
refugees pressed their grievances upon the camp officials: “speaking passionately, one of the newly 
elected leaders from Dagahaley camp asked to…expedite the process of registering asylum seekers in 
order to smoothen the delivery of services by agencies in the camps” (Minutes, secondary document 
5). Importantly, the value of the council as a bridge between the two worlds was not only in the 
opportunity that it provided for the grievances to be expressed. It did two other things. First, it gave 
credibility to the assurances of the camp employees that there would be an increase in the number of 
staff in order to accelerate the registration process, that an arrival kit for new refugees waiting to be 
registered would be implemented, and that new refugees would be given clearer directions on where 
to wait for their registration so as to avoid them settling in inappropriate places.  
But second, the assurances were then easily and quickly transmitted through the mosaic of the 
informal ties by which the councils were embedded within the Somali institutional world. The councils 
thus helped dampen the angry behaviors. Following the riot, council meetings became more explicitly 
recognized as a crucial vehicle for securing social stability by serving “as a link between the community 
and the agencies” (NGO report 3). They are now appreciated as litmus tests of possible unrest, and 
constitute a formal integrating mechanism by which to use, and, where necessary, restore the respected 
space. 
------------------------ 
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The Exceptional Breach: Gender. Even though the two mechanisms are successful overall, 
there is one aspect where the respected space is consistently breached – the treatment of women. 
Examining this breach highlights the significance of the two mechanisms and the underlying salience 
of mutual dependence.    
Somali gender norms constitute a fundamental component of the refugees’ institutionalized 
world. We have already noted that this norm is breached in the electoral arrangements, which prescribe 
female involvement. It is also breached in the hiring of paid volunteers, which is the only legal way 
for refugees to earn income. Driven by the expectations of camp sponsors, equal numbers of men 
and women are always hired. 
“We try to ensure that there is a proportionate representation of women employed to help 
with the distribution…Overall, I think that we do have a fairly good representation of women 
all things considered.” (Interview, camp official 17) 
 
Gender balanced hiring and council representation, however, run counter to, and undermine, Somali 
culture in which men are responsible for earning family income and for representing their family’s 
interests, whereas women are expected to raise children and organize the household. This breach of 
the respected space has potential risks: 
“The majority of programs turn gender equality into a zero-sum game. What I mean by that 
is that men perceive that opportunities are unfairly taken away from them and given to women. 
That often causes a lot of resentment among men. And also among women, who bear the 
consequences. They don’t want their husbands sitting around in the house doing nothing 
either.” (Interview, expert consultant 5) 
 
Publicly, male refugees tolerate the breach. They do so because they are aware that hiring 
practices are recorded and used in reports and appeals to outside sponsors. However, this apparent 
tolerance disappears in settings less visible to camp officials. In the presence of camp employees, such 
as during food distributions conducted by stipended female refugees, and during the gender balanced 
council meetings, male refugees behave politely and respectfully. However, within the refugees’ 
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institutional world, gendered programs are made to conform to Somali culture. Female refugees 
reported to us that their husbands largely decide how the income that the females have earned is used. 
Moreover, “sexual violence has become endemic” (Media report 6).  
In our interviews with female refugees, the sensitive topic of gender-based violence was met 
with long silences and requests to change the topic. Their body language became guarded and, in 
phone interviews, the tone grew tense. As in many cultures, rape and domestic violence are also taboo 
among Somalis. Moreover, as a former camp official explains: “the absence of effective witness 
protection arrangements; the fear of revenge attacks; the shame experiences by victims of rape” (Crisp, 
2000: 66) further prevents refugees from speaking out. Nonetheless, one female admitted to us: “I 
wish they would give my job to my husband. My life at home would be more peaceful.” (Interview, 
refugee 6). An NGO report summarizes these adverse consequences more bluntly: 
“Programmes mainly target women and equip them with skills to make them financially 
independent which is a positive change for women. Men who cannot carry out their gender 
roles may react to these changes with depression, alcoholism and an escalation of violence 
against women.” (NGO report 3) 
Nonetheless, women acknowledge and refer to the Dadaab camp as a “peace zone” (Al Jazeera, 2016: 
video) because they are acutely aware of the extreme forms of gender-based violence endemic to Al 
Shabaab-controlled territory in Somalia. Given the brutality of the Al Shabaab regime, many women 
seem to accept incidents of domestic violence in exchange for the relative safety of their family in 
Dadaab. Camp employees are also aware of these dynamics: “Although the leadership structure is 
gender balanced, women’s participation in decision making is generally poor. This is influenced by 
strong cultural traditions” (NGO report 7). However, camp employees largely turn a blind eye to how 
their efforts at promoting gender equality receive little more than ceremonial acceptance, thereby 
reaffirming the principle of non-intrusion into the other’s institutional world.  
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DISCUSSION  
Our starting point was to understand how and why the refugee camp – which we have 
proposed resembles a total institution yet also exhibits distinctive characteristics – does not implode. 
We have sought to identify the mechanisms that sustain social stability within this organizational form, 
and to understand why those mechanisms are successful. These mechanisms, we will suggest, have 
relevance beyond refugee camps and add to the conversation over organizational differences. 
 
Refugee Camps as Total Institutions 
We noted earlier that Goffman (1961) identified four variables on which his five types of total 
institutions differ: permeability to the outside world, the “spirit of entry” (Goffman, 1961: 110), 
differentiation within the staff and inmate worlds, and the collective purpose of the organization. We 
have shown that refugee camps exhibit a unique constellation of these four variables. First, their 
permeability differs from that of other total institutions such as nursing homes in that refugees are 
unable to physically leave and re-enter the camp. Second, refugees initially enter voluntarily but over 
time their stay becomes increasingly involuntary as exit opportunities diminish. Third, the camp’s 
‘inmate’ and staff worlds are highly differentiated making refugee camps similar to prisons. However, 
fourth, and unlike any of the total institutions identified by Goffman, camp officials actively seek no 
change in the ‘inmate’. The idea is that the camp is a ‘suspended space’ (Turner, 2005) in which 
refugees passively wait until it is safe to return to their former homes. In short, aspects of the refugee 
camp resemble various total institutions but none of Goffman’s types quite captures the refugee camp. 
In addition to the above distinguishing features, we have elaborated four more: the mode of 
entry, the duration of stay, the degree of surveillance, and the extent of scheduling. First, many 
refugees enter the camp not as individuals (which is typical of most other total institutions) but with 
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family members. This form of entry prevents the loss of “certain stable social arrangements” 
(Goffman, 1961: 24) and nullifies the possibility of the “mortification” processes that characterize 
entry into other total institutions. Second, unlike prisons and mental hospitals (Denzin, 1968; Wulbert, 
1965), refugees are not incarcerated and can move relatively freely inside the camp (although freedom 
of movement outside the camp is highly restricted). Third, refugees spend an undefined length of time 
in the camp. Unlike in prisons, work camps, or boarding schools, the duration of stay is not dependent 
on behavior but on circumstances outside the refugees’ control. Finally, the camp protects and 
provides for refugees’ survival but refrains from involvement in their day-to-day life. This is the reverse 
of the situation in other total institutions, where inmates “have their full day scheduled for them” 
(Goffman, 1961: 20). We thus propose that refugee camps are similar to total institutions but 
nonetheless constitute a distinctive type of organization and variant of the total institution, whose 
characteristics we have elucidated in this paper. 
These defining characteristics of the refugee camp have two important implications, which are 
summarized in Figure 1. First, they generate a mutual dependence between inmates and staff in a way not 
found in other total institutions. As we have shown, the sheer scale of a refugee camp combined with 
the vulnerable collective purpose and the voluntary entry of refugees into the camp prohibits the 
possibility of any arrangement similar to the highly coercive structure of a prison. Second, this mutual 
dependence enables the emergence and use of two distinctive mechanisms of social stability: respected 
space and listening posts.  
These complementary mechanisms are possible because of the circumstance of mutual 
dependence, but they are also enabled by several characteristics of the refugee camp – notably, the 
voluntary entry into the camp, usually as a family, which facilitates the importing of the refugee’s 
institutional world; and, because camp officials do not seek to change the ‘inmates’ and can employ 
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only limited surveillance and scheduling, this second institutional world is able to emerge alongside 
the Western bureaucracy of the camp officials. The high degree of differentiation between these two 
institutional worlds, combined with the indefinite stay of the inmates, leads to the emergence of a 
respected space and a listening post that together contribute to social stability. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
Our study, therefore, provides insight into the organization of refugee camps by applying 
Goffman’s (1961) concept of total institutions. We have specified the several features that define this 
type of organization and identified its novel mechanisms of social stability. In doing so, we have 
extended the concept of total institution. Although Goffman’s work on total institutions has been 
influential in other disciplines – for example Foucault (1978) refers to prisons as “complete and austere 
institutions” (231) – “little attention” has been paid to them by organization theorists (Clegg, 2006: 
427). The handful of studies of today’s widely used total institutions, such as modern prisons or 
psychiatric wards, are ‘soft’ versions of those described by Goffman (Davies, 1989; Odrowaz-Coates, 
2015; Scott, 2010; Shenkar, 1996). In this paper we have put forward not a soft version, but a 
distinctive type of organization that is closely related to total institutions but which has emerged only 
since Goffman’s writing. 
Interestingly, the role of the respected space in our setting complements but differs from 
previous research, which has noted how difficult it is to reach organizational decisions under 
conditions of mutual dependence. For example, the tension between principal and agent interests in 
organizational governance is anchored in mutual dependence and information asymmetry (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Grossman & Hart, 1980, 1983) and the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) arises from 
the negative consequences of mutual dependence and the pursuit of self-interest. The problematic 
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consequences of mutual dependence are perhaps most poignant in studies on climate change regimes, 
where actors’ mutual dependence and free riding hampers effective decision-making (Wijen & Ansari, 
2007). The risks and deficits associated with mutual dependence have thus been brought to the fore. 
In our study, conversely, we find that mutual dependence is the antecedent to social stability because 
of the emergence of a respected space, wherein both organizational parties tolerate and minimally 
intrude upon the others’ life world, and of listening posts that maintain and restore social stability. 
Mutual dependence ensures a power balance (Emerson, 1962), in which neither institutional world 
dominates the other, and as a result differentiation between the two institutional worlds will remain 
high because neither of the two worlds will be motivated to wittingly breach the respected space. Our 
study thus elucidates the organizational characteristics under which mutual dependence can lead to 
social stability rather than organizational deficits. 
 
Boundary-Bridging through Distancing 
The concept of respected space offers a novel perspective on internal organizational 
boundaries. Organization scholars have long been interested in the difficulty of bringing the different 
components of an organization together under one “organizational tent” (Hedberg, Nystrom, & 
Starbuck, 1976: 45). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) studied the “integrative devices” (12) that enable 
effective collaboration across differentiated organizational departments, and Tushman (1977) 
elaborated how individuals take on ‘boundary roles’ to facilitate innovation. Recent literature elucidates 
how integrating mechanisms vary between types of organizations, e.g., ‘trading zones’ in heterarchies 
(Kellogg et al., 2006), ‘pluralist’ individuals in hybrid organizations (Besharov, 2014), or ‘boundary 
objects’ (Carlile, 2002) in contexts of innovation. Moreover, organizations have also been found to 
build integrating mechanisms with their environment through ‘boundary-spanning structures’ (Rao & 
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Sivakumar, 1999) and ‘boundary organizations’ (O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008). Taken together, there is 
consensus in the literature that integrating mechanisms serve as a bridge to connect departments, 
groups, or individuals so that they can effectively work together in the pursuit of the organization’s 
goals. 
The integrative mechanisms we have discovered – respected space and listening posts – differ 
from these earlier accounts in that it is the creation of distance between groups of actors that enables 
collaboration. In refugee camps, the respected space functions as a buffer zone between the worlds 
of camp officials and refugees, and constitutes a mechanism by which to effectively minimize 
intrusions into the other’s world – thus allowing it to perform those functions that contribute to social 
stability (e.g., in our case, the Somali world reduced boredom, contained violence, and suppressed 
terrorist recruitment efforts). Rather than bringing organizational components closer together, as is 
classically the role of integrating mechanisms, respected space performs an integrative function 
paradoxically by distancing the two organizational worlds of the camp, thus preventing the camp 
organization from disintegrating due to violent conflict and rioting. By distancing the institutional 
worlds, the respected space thus ensures the integration of the organization as a whole. The listening 
post, as a complementary mechanism, functions as a safety valve and for information exchange rather 
than as a vehicle for collaboration – as is the case for boundary objects (Carlile, 2002) and trading 
zones (Kellogg et al., 2006).  
In part, these distinctive integrating mechanisms result from the type of organization we have 
studied. The refugee camp’s primary objective, i.e., the provision of humanitarian aid to refugees, does 
not require collaboration between camp officials and refugees – there would be little mutual 
dependence. Yet the two groups became much more dependent upon each other as a secondary 
objective emerged - namely preventing terrorists from infiltrating the camp. As a result, the respected 
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space and listening posts became critical to the functioning of the organization through non-integration 
of the organization’s differentiated components.  
Refugee camps are very different in several respects from most other organizational forms. 
Yet the central theme of respected spaces and listening posts as complementary mechanisms for 
allowing yet constraining intra-organizational difference has, we suggest, wider relevance. For 
example, in the past decade large accounting firms have moved towards the multi-disciplinary practice 
(MDP) as they added consulting to their portfolio of services (Greenwood et al, 1995; Greenwood et 
al., 2017). In the MDP there is a mutual dependence between accountants and consultants, in that 
both occupations rely upon the reputation of the firm for success, often serve the same client, and 
refer clients to each other. Nevertheless, a central challenge arises from the very different norms and 
practices of these two occupational groups – the one highly socialized into a set of normative 
arrangements that culminate in a ‘professional partnership’ form of governance, the other operating 
within a more managerial and entrepreneurial culture (Empson, 2001; 2015). The challenge has been 
(and still is) to allow each occupation the relative freedom – respected space - to pursue and serve 
clients without compromising the ability of the other to perform their activities (in particular, to avoid 
the consulting approach disturbing the more conservative approach of professional accountants). In 
this sense, the MDP is a vehicle that seeks to balance respective spaces with listening posts. In these 
organizations, listening posts often take a more informal form such as in their lavish dining rooms 
(where peers typically cluster) and in local bars (where there is also more casual interactions between 
seniors and juniors).  
A second, perhaps more intriguing example is the university. Despite having overarching 
bureaucratic arrangements that specify, for example, tenure and promotion criteria, universities 
implicitly recognize that different disciplines have their own understandings and interpretations of 
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merit. Hence, there is a measure of independence and tolerance across disciplines in how the 
overarching ‘rules’ are interpreted and applied. In effect, there are respected spaces within the 
university. The equivalent of listening posts, we suggest, are arrangements such as meetings of deans, 
or committees that allocate and adjudicate university wide awards. An interesting feature of 
universities is that they have respective spaces both horizontally, i.e., between disciplines, and 
vertically, i.e., between those disciplines and the overarching university administration.       
Our point is that the mechanisms of respected spaces and listening posts resonate with 
organizational forms other than refugee camps. The refugee camp is perhaps the extreme example in 
that the differentiation – ‘institutional distance’, to use Kostova and Roth’s (2002) term – between the 
two institutional worlds within the organization is distinctly higher than in (for example) professional 
service firms or universities. Nevertheless, in all contexts where organizational actors are mutually 
dependent but also highly (and necessarily) differentiated in their purposes and approach, distance 
rather than proximity between the different worlds is required and is accomplished by a combination 
of respected space and listening posts.  
Understanding the specific form that these mechanisms take in particular organizational 
contexts would be an informative direction for future research. In particular, we suggest that especial 
attention be given to uncovering the forms and nature of listening posts. What form do they take and 
how and under what circumstances might they be successful? Our study implies that a listening post 
should meet three criteria for success. First, the post itself must have legitimacy in the eyes of those 
representing the different worlds. In the Dadaab case, this legitimacy was earned by the responsiveness 
of the camp officials to the issues and concerns raised by the refugee representatives – especially given 
that the council had no formal authority. By actively responding to the concerns, the camp officials 
signaled their willingness to hear and act – avoiding the risk that the council be dismissed as a mere 
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token or a mouthpiece for the camp officials. Second, those associated with the listening post – in our 
case, members on the council - must have respect and trust in each other. Their interactions must be 
relational rather than formal (Powell & Oberg, 2017) – indicated in our case by the openly emotional 
way by which refugee communicated their views. Third, the sides of the listening post must be 
embedded within the worlds that they represent and connect. In our case, the refugees on the council 
were closely connected to the social and political structures of the Somali world, which meant that 
they were sensitive to, and aware of, happenings within that world; and, that they could disseminate 
the responses and the concerns of the camp officials in an expeditious manner. Given the nature of 
the issues and potential threats to social stability, the prerequisite of a speedy response in this context 
is vital. It remains to be learned, of course, whether these are the three prerequisites of an effective 
listening post.  
A rather different direction of research is prompted by Gouldner’s (1954a; 1954b) study of a 
wildcat strike. Gouldner was interested in ‘patterns’ of bureaucracy and identified one – the ‘mock 
bureaucracy’ – that, in some respects, foreshadows the refugee camp. In a mock bureaucracy formal 
rules may be prescribed by an outsider to the organization (in Gouldner’s case, by insurance firms) yet 
are ignored by all organizational members – unless a representative of that outside firm is present.  A 
mock bureaucracy, in other words, pays lip service to a particular set of formal rules and organizational 
members are aware that not conforming to them will not be punished. There is a clear resemblance 
to our refugee camp, in that both inmates and officials were turning a blind eye to the non-
enforcement of various rules.  
An especially interesting observation by Gouldner, however, and one that suggests an 
important direction for research is that attempts to enforce rules and procedures – as happened in the 
gypsum mine when a new CEO was installed – can trigger high resistance and even violence (in the 
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gypsum mine there was a wildcat strike). Again, the similarity with our refugee case is obvious – the 
one serious breach of the respected space led to violence. We know little, however, about how 
breaches of respected spaces might occur and how they might play out. We surmise that different 
contexts – e.g., whether professional service firms, or universities – likely have distinct types of 
breaches and means of handling them. In order to understand the contribution of respected spaces 
and listening posts as vehicles of organizing, it follows that research is needed into how and why those 
mechanisms fail – and how they might be restored. 
A final direction for future research suggested by our case concerns possible differences in the 
mechanisms of social stability at different time periods. Our case reveals how mature refugee camps 
maintain social stability but can offer no insights into how such dynamics may change with the 
longevity of the camp. Our findings indicate that, although refugees enter a camp as vulnerable victims, 
as they recuperate they become increasingly bored and look for ways to reclaim economic, social, and 
cultural agency. This might suggest that long-term camps are increasingly unstable as refugees’ 
boredom and frustration with their situation increases. However, research on other total institutions, 
e.g., prisons, has shown that those housing long-term inmates tend to be more tranquil than those 
with short-term inmates (Flanagan, 1980). Since a key difference between refugee camps and prisons 
is that refugees have no specified departure date from the camp, further research might address and 
compare the mechanisms of social stability in short and long term camps8. 
 
CONCLUSION 
                                                 
8 The first author’s current research into newly established refugee camps suggests that although respected 
spaces emerge relatively early on, listening posts are absent in camps that have only been in place for a few 
months. 
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By ‘discovering’ a new type of organization and its distinctive mechanisms we have re-engaged 
with the early interest within organization theory in understanding specific organizational types, rather 
than their generic similarities. Early studies highlighted the differences across organizations, and 
comparative analysis was commonly used to sharpen understandings of them (Heydebrand, 1973; 
March, 1965). Subsequently, attention focused upon similarities on the implicit assumption that, for 
the most part, ‘organizations’ can be treated as homogenous – i.e., that it is the similarities not 
differences that are worthy of particular attention. More recently, the importance of difference has 
been re-emphasized (e.g., Greenwood et al., 2014; Whetten, 2009) and the need to dig more resolutely 
into differences in order to capture and understand significant issues has been underlined (e.g., Miller, 
2017). Our study connects to this debate by turning attention to a neglected organizational form – the 
refugee camp. It also connects with concerns over the silence of management scholarship regarding 
major societal and economic developments, (Munir, 2011; Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015; George, 
Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016).  In the context of an increasingly global refugee crisis, 
refugee camps have become important organizations, which means that studying and understanding 
them is, in itself, important. Our paper is a first step in this endeavor. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Core Concepts, Data Sources, and Illustrative Data 
 
 
Core Concepts 
 
Data Sources 
 
Illustrative Data 
 
1. Two Institutional 
Worlds, One 
Organization 
A. Western Bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Somali social 
Structures 
 
 
 
2. Mutual Dependence 
C. The Dependence of 
Camp Officials 
 
 
 
 
 
D. The Dependence of 
the Refugees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Reports 
 
 
● Field notes 
 
 
 
 
 
● Interviews 
 
 
 
 
● Field notes 
 
● Interviews 
 
 
● Reports 
 
 
 
● Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- The camp’s field officer…was unmoved. Indeed, that was his job: Like all the well-heeled 
international staff, he was paid nearly nine thousand dollars a month, tax free, to allow the wheels of 
bureaucracy to turn at their own pace. (Book 2) 
- Walking into the compound means stepping into the world that the UN staff are all familiar and 
comfortable with: polished offices sealed off from the starving children, traumatized women, and 
injured men outside. In the compound, you nearly forget about the humanitarian drama happening 
outside. (Field notes, day 19) 
 
- Everything is available. There are people who are refugees who are making business because they 
have a link with the host community. So the shopping from Nairobi, they will send a friend from the 
host community who will buy for them and bring it to the camp. And there they can sell. So business 
is going on. (Interview, refugee 5) 
- Observation, day 2: Refugees start their day with the first Muslim prayer at around 5:30AM 
 
- The UNHCR, they don’t stop the businesses. They don’t help us with the businesses but they also 
do not stop us. I think they just pretend that they are not there because it is easier for them that way. 
(Interview, refugee 3) 
- He emphasized the effective role that the CPST (refugee-organized police force) play in keeping 
peace in the world’s largest refugee camp as ‘community police’ teams of refugee volunteers recruited 
by the refugee leaders. (NGO report 5) 
 
- We also provide protection for refugees. This is primarily in legal terms. We help them understand 
what to do if they are arrested. We tell them that these are the numbers you can call and who you 
need to speak to. That way they will not be harassed by the police as much. (Interview, camp 
employee 7) 
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Mechanism 1: 
Respected Spaces 
 
 
 
 
 
Mechanism 2: 
Listening Posts 
F. Listening Post as 
Information Exchange 
 
 
 
G. Listening Post as a 
Safety Valve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H. The Exceptional 
Breach: Gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Field notes 
 
 
● Interviews 
 
 
 
● Reports 
● Interviews 
 
 
 
- stopped by police, even when they travel with an official permit we issue them. They are forced to 
pay a bribe and police officers sometimes hold them in custody without giving a reason (Interview, 
camp official 8) 
 
- Field notes, day 7, conversation with camp official: I haven’t been to the camp part of Dadaab 
[where refugees’ live] in weeks. (…) Really, I can do my work from here [Camp officials’ compound] 
where I have access to a computer. I don’t need to go into the camp for what I do, really. 
- There might be one or two opportunities a month, I’d say, where if you’re lucky you get to talk to 
the refugee leaders. Other than that, we don’t have much to do with their [the refugees’] business, I’d 
say. (Interview, camp official 12) 
 
- Refugee leadership has little to no decision-making authority (Media report 5) 
- Camp leaders are the overall chairmen in the camp. They are between the UNHCR and the 
community. They are our leaders (Interview, refugee 8) 
- The leaders also collect information from the community that can be helpful. They will report to 
UNHCR, for example if there is a problem or if someone is trying to do bad things. (Interview, 
refugee 5) 
 
- The situation deteriorated to the point where police used tear gas, but it did not work. Then police 
fired on the rioters, leading to the deaths and injuries. (Media report 4 describing the 2011 riot) 
- The issues discussed included security, unemployment, youth empowerment training and drug 
abuse. Top of the agenda was the recent eruption of violent protest (Field report 2 on council 
meeting following 2011 riot) 
- “We like to know what’s going on, make sure nothing’s building up in the refugee communities” 
(Interview, camp official 1) 
- The democratic UN camp elections robbed the male-dominated clan of its organizing role in social 
life. The agencies tried to give the few incentive positions they had to women to encourage what they 
called ‘gender balance’ and, apart from those who chose to hustle in the market for a pittance, the 
remainder of the male population had no ability to provide for their families. They felt emasculated. 
(NGO Report 4) 
- Back in Somalia I used to have lots of cows and camels and I used to provide for my family. Now 
that am here in Kenya, I have to beg agencies to give me shelter and mattresses for my family. I feel 
like a failure. (Interview with male refugee in NGO report 6) 
- Women are routinely attacked when they leave the camps to collect firewood. The daily frustrations 
 
● Reports 
 
 
 
 
● Interviews 
 
 
● Reports 
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of camp life, unemployment and alcohol abuse create an environment which fosters SGBV [sexual 
and gender-based violence]. (NGO report 7) 
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FIGURE 1 
A New Type of Organization 
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PHOTO 1 
Refugee-run business and market street in Dadaab refugee camp 
 
 
 
PHOTO 2 
Recently established section of the Dadaab refugee camp 
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   (copyright: Google Maps) 
 
PHOTO 3 
Older section of the Dadaab refugee camp 
 
      (copyright: Google Maps 
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